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The quality of adjudicative procedure is fundamental to how litigants
and the general public view the jusice sysem’s integrity. Across
criminal and civil proceedings, procedural jusice research shows that
people want to have a voice, be respected, and have their cases
heard by neutral and even-handed adjudicators.1 Taking part in a
procedure with these hallmarks infuences parties’ evaluations of the
integrity and neutrality of the jusice sysem, including that of judges
and other adjudicators, and of the ultimate outcome.2 Likewise, the
general public assesses the jusice sysem’s fairness and integrity
based in part on its provision of procedural

jusice.3
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public’s motivation to respect judicial decisions and the rule of law. 4
In the context of corporate reorganization, scholars have given too
little attention to the importance of the chapter 11 bankruptcy
process.5 But in The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization
After Jevic, Jonathan Lipson explicitly links the chapter 11 process
with the Bankruptcy Code’s subsantive rules about priority, 6 crafting
a forceful argument about what procedural values the U.S. Supreme
Court sought to uphold when it penned Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
Corp.7 In doing so, Lipson expounds on a broader truth about the co-
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option of corporate reorganization’s process in the name of value
preservation. Procedural jusice teaches that the process is as
important as the fnal outcome. If chapter 11 is to remain respected,
the lessons of Jevic that Lipson brings to light mus be acknowledged
and discussed fully. If they are not, corporate reorganization risks
turning into a sysem that disregards the interess and voices of
parties en masse, potentially subverting the very tenet of value
maximization that currently animates corporate reorganization.
This Response expands upon Lipson’s argument to add to the
conversation about the place of procedural jusice in corporate
reorganization.8 It frs discusses why Lipson correctly asserts that
Jevic is as much about process as priority by focusing on two of the
three process values that Lipson identifes—participation and
procedural integrity. These values align almos seamlessly with
procedural jusice research. It then considers how Jevic’s emphasis
on process should embolden bankruptcy courts to more rigorously
assess chapter 11’s procedures. The Response ends by identifying
two points at the beginning of chapter 11 cases that are ripe for
analysis under Jevic’s process lens, the assessment of which I argue
will enhance parties’ and the public’s confdence in corporate
reorganizations.
I. PRIORITY’S PROCESS VALUES
As is true across the legal sysem, bankruptcy’s procedures are
important. The claims process esablishes the treatment of creditors
in all bankruptcy cases.9 That treatment provides creditors with
bargaining power based on their priority. 10 Chapter 11 plan
confrmation sandards recognize and incorporate that treatment,
with the important caveat that parties may consent to diferent
treatment.11
Increasingly, however, the chapter 11 cases of larger companies
(based on measures of assets and debts) involve sales of all assets
through bankruptcy court-approved auctions under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code.12 The rise of “363 sales” was facilitated by
practitioners’ adeptness at ushering cases that traditionally would
have required plan confrmation through other Code provisions by
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arguing, for insance, that sales are necessary to preserve value in
danger of “melting” away. 13 And with the rise of these sales,
quesions about how parties’ rights are to be preserved through quick
sales and other processes have occupied courts and scholars of
late.14
The facts and procedure of Jevic pose a new use of the Code’s
provisions that implicates similar quesions about parties’ rights in the
absence of a traditional plan confrmation.15 Structured dismissals,
such as the one created by the settling parties in Jevic, threaten the
integrity of the Code’s priority scheme. Rather than engage in the
plan process, through which all parties have the chance to negotiate
under a set sructure that includes disclosures, certain parties decide
which other parties should receive what portions of a business’s
value upon dismissal.16
In Jevic, the parties of interes were private equity invesors, their
bankers, and a group of truck drivers who had worked for Jevic
Transportation Company before being terminated without sufcient
notice.17 The invesors and bankers faced fraudulent conveyance
actions related to their leveraged buyout (LBO) of Jevic.18 The
drivers held Worker Adjusment and Retraining Notifcation (WARN)
Act claims agains Jevic, which in part were entitled to priority
payment ahead of other unsecured claims.19 The sructured
dismissal of Jevic’s chapter 11 case—negotiated by the invesors,
the bankers, Jevic, and the unsecured creditors’ committee—
provided that payout from the debtor’s esate would bypass the
drivers, despite their entitlement to priority payment under the Code.
It also dismissed the LBO suit with prejudice.20
As with mos sructured dismissals, the debtor and other parties
championing this scheme argued that if the court did not approve
their deal, the total value disributed to all creditors would decrease.21
As Lipson explains, making an end run around both plan confrmation
and the chapter 7 liquidation procedure which accompanies
conversion—all in the name of “some greater good”—usually benefts
powerful parties while cutting out weaker parties.22 Parties who are
“powerful” mos often draw their infuence from monetary invesment
in the debtor business, such as from pre-petition loans or pos-
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petition fnancing. With this invesment, they can guide the timing,
direction, and objectives of chapter 11 cases. 23
This held true in Jevic. The invesors and bankers did not want to be
embroiled in an LBO suit or see money paid to the truck drivers who
were a thorn in both Jevic’s and the invesors’ sides. 24 Through the
sructured dismissal, the invesors and bankers ensured that the LBO
would not come back to haunt them and that the drivers would not be
paid anything on their claims.25
In sriking down Jevic’s sructured dismissal, the U.S. Supreme Court
focused on the lack of afrmative consent from the afected drivers to
the priority skipping, combined with the signifcance of priority as “a
basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law.” 26 Lipson aptly
couches the issue of consent as Type I and II error—a false positive
and negative, respectively. 27 Without clear consent, a court cannot
know whether a party’s seeming assent is in error or whether a
party’s silence does not indicate assent.28 In comparison, the Code’s
plan voting sructure forces parties to manifes their consent.29 As
Lipson notes, in fnding that sructured dismissals mus follow priority
rules absent parties’ clear consent, even when a court predicts that
only the clearly consenting parties will receive a “meaningful
disribution,”30 the Court held that “consent trumps closure.”31 And,
importantly, that holding includes closure that osensibly maximizes
disribution to creditors.
Stated diferently, Jevic elevates parties’ voices over value
preservation and maximization. It was far from obvious that the Court
would reach a holding and pen an opinion that is interpretable
through a procedural jusice lens. Value preservation and
maximization have become the leading calling cards of corporate
reorganization. Process—and the participation that often comes with
process—easily could have fallen to the wayside.
Lipson identifes three “process values” that he argues are
incorporated into the Court’s elevation of consent: participation,
predictability, and procedural integrity. 32 Of these, participation and
integrity together encompass the four components of how people
assess if they received procedural jusice: whether people (1) think
that they had a voice and chance to be heard, (2) perceive that they
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were treated with dignity and respect, (3) believe that the decisionmaker sincerely considered their case, and (4) observe the forum as
neutral and even-handed.33
Firs, procedural jusice research describes participation as the ability
to have a voice and thereby have the chance to be heard by a
court.34 The opportunity to be heard—that is, participation—is the
mos important factor in people’s assessments of procedural
jusice.35 Believing that one has a voice afects people’s evaluations
of whether they received the three other components of procedural
jusice.36 These factors collectively imbue a legal proceeding with
integrity, which is the second “process value” that Lipson identifes.
The fnal value that Lipson identifes, predictability, also connects to
procedural jusice. Lipson links predictability with the Court’s decision
to uphold absolute priority and thus narrow the outcomes that parties
can bargain around, which may make consent easier to reach and to
demonsrate.37 But research shows that procedural jusice also is
important to parties during negotiations, and that it can be fosered
by private parties.39 Requiring parties to explicitly demonsrate
consent when asking a court to allow a deviation from absolute
priority likewise should encourage private parties to put into place
negotiation processes that support procedural jusice. Advancing
procedurally rigorous negotiations is especially vital in the context of
corporate reorganization because chapter 11 “is designed to produce
negotiated settlements rather than litigated judgments.”39
Regardless, Lipson’s focus on participation and procedural integrity
as hallmarks of the process that the Court sought to facilitate when
requiring consent to sructured dismissals deviating from absolute
priority exposes that Jevic is as much about procedural jusice as it is
about the Code’s priority rules. When the Court identifed priority as
“a basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law”40 and discussed
collusion among parties,41 it advanced a theory of procedural jusice
in corporate reorganization, even though it did not formulate its
decision in those terms. Requiring afrmative consent to sructured
dismissals that alter parties’ sandard rights confrms to parties that
their voices will be heard. And, in terms of Lipson’s Type I and II
errors, it shows that bankruptcy judges will not take parties’
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osensible silence as manifesation of their consent to a settlement in
which they may not have had a voice.42 Collectively, the process will
make parties feel that they were treated with respect and that an
even-handed decision maker considered their interess—even if the
parties recover nothing.
It is these procedural jusice values that the plan process, complete
with its required disclosures, ultimately afords all creditors. Although
plan confrmation takes time and money, Jevic can be read to show
that courts should not tolerate a weakening of the procedural jusice
that the plan process afords in the name of efciency and value
maximization, even in the resource-consrained context of chapter
11. 43 Research about procedural jusice esablishes why preserving
process is essential.44 Legal sysems that provide procedural jusice
garner respect; legal sysems that impair procedural jusice open
themselves up to criticism and to disregard for their orders.
One of the key insights of Jevic is the importance of afording parties
a voice in a way that they believe they will be heard and sincerely
considered. Lipson’s focus on the process embedded in priority
brings this truth to light. Indeed, that the Court was not sidelined by
the argument that the particular facts of Jevic’s sructural dismissal
presented a “rare case” with “sufcient reasons” to disregard priority
further shows its undersanding of process’s importance.45 Insead of
fnding Jevic’s facts “rare,” the Court noted that corporate
reorganization is replete with “cases that turn on comparably dubious
predictions.”46 The consequence of “similar claims being made in
many, not jus a few, cases” may be collusion among secured
creditors, management, and favored creditors to squeeze out other
parties.47 Providing procedural jusice to all parties through priority
wards agains such collusion, which is part of “the balance sruck by
the [Code]” and efectuated by priority’s process, such as via plan
confrmation sandards.48 It was this process—and its promise that
parties’ voices will be heard and considered—that the Court declined
to sacrifce.
II. EXTENDING JEVIC’S PROCESS VALUES
In building his argument that Jevic is as much about process as
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priority, Lipson highlights two ongoing debates about corporate
reorganization. The frs focuses on how much control secured
creditors should have over a business’s chapter 11 case, 49 which
may be characterized as simply reallocating a company’s capital.
The second, which hisorically has earned less attention, focuses on
whether corporate reorganization “should be undersood as involving
more than simply economic adjusments.”50 In line with the balance
that the U.S. Supreme Court faced in Jevic between process and
value preservation, these debates focus principally on weighing the
broader efects of the chapter 11 sysem agains wealth
maximization, particularly with respect to creditors with large
economic sakes in reorganizing businesses.
As Melissa Jacoby recently discussed in depth, the chapter 11
sysem necessarily implicates interess beyond those of voluntary
creditors and lenders.51 It afects non-consensual creditors, such as
sexual assault victims and the WARN claimants in Jevic52 ; it afects
companies’ workers, even if they hold no claims in cases; and it
afects the ongoing fnances of the towns and cities where large
business are located. It also afects consensual creditors to the
extent that the safeguards built into chapter 11, such as plan
confrmation, are manipulated or bypassed in the name of value
preservation.53 As Lipson summarized, “Chapter 11 is a hybrid,
public-private process. Because it occurs in and around courts, it is
(or should be) more than simply a negotiated reallocation of
wealth.”54
The Court’s Jevic analysis—requiring that process be aforded to
parties in sructured dismissals—can and should be extended to
other circumsances in which powerful parties seek to circumvent the
Code’s procedural protections.55 Procedural jusice research shows
that it is worthwhile to give a voice to all parties involved in corporate
reorganizations. Indeed, there are sound reasons to think that there
is greater value in afording parties procedural jusice in chapter 11
than in other legal contexts. As noted, procedural jusice increases
parties’ confdence in outcomes, even when those outcomes run
counter to their interess, and engenders trus in the legal insitution
as a whole.56
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Both of these benefts are particularly important to the bankruptcy
sysem. Unlike many other parts of the legal sysem, which usually
adjudicate disputes between two or a few parties, the business
bankruptcy sysem oversees disputes that can involve tens of
thousands of parties. The fnal outcomes of reorganization cases
may profoundly afect the lives of those parties immediately involved,
as well as other consituencies.57 There are myriad opportunities for
people to think that they were taken advantage of, to believe that
they were ignored, or to deem the sysem rigged agains particular
parties. And each of these opportunities may end in disregard or
contempt for individual case outcomes, which can taint perceptions
of the entire chapter 11 sysem.
Billions of dollars in assets and debts move through the business
bankruptcy sysem every year. And companies of immense
importance to the American and world economy seek to reorganize
every year. 58 Given this, those concerned about preserving positive
perceptions of corporate reorganization and ensuring that chapter 11
remains an even-handed insitution should pay serious attention to
preventing the sort of process abuses addressed in Jevic.
The Court’s reasoning in Jevic yields some general tenets that
bankruptcy courts can call upon in the future when assessing
requess that sidesep chapter 11’s fundamental procedures. Lipson
is correct that Jevic gives few sraightforward guidelines for
determining which (and the extent to which) parties’ interess courts
should prioritize going forward.59 But there are general procedural
jusice values embedded in Jevic that courts should utilize in the
future.
These values include afording representation such that all parties’
voices truly are heard, especially those of non-consensual creditors.
These creditors may be particularly at risk of being excluded from
negotiations because other parties may view non-consensual
creditors’ claims as the primary contributor to the business’s need to
fle bankruptcy. 60 General procedural jusice values also include
obtaining afrmative consent from afected parties to any deal that
bypasses the Code’s plan confrmation or any other sandard that
would alter parties’ economic interess, mos notably priority. And
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they include giving sufcient time for all parties and sysem actors,
such as bankruptcy judges, to consider the scope of the issues at
sake.61
Efectuating these values likely will demand a lengthier process than
presently aforded to larger businesses’ chapter 11 cases. A
trusworthy process almos necessarily requires time. Given the trend
in corporate reorganization toward speeding up cases in the name of
value preservation, that these values will require chapter 11 cases to
las longer makes sense.62 But that time should be well spent given
the importance of providing procedural jusice to the legal sysem’s
integrity.
III. TWO EXAMPLES OF EXTENDING JEVIC’S PROCESS VALUES
At the end of his article, Lipson invites scholars and practitioners to
think more about the relationship between process and priority in
reorganization.63 He includes a lis of quesions, mos of which
involve practices that remove corporate reorganization from the plan
confrmation process or that concentrate power in the hands of
secured creditors early on during a chapter 11 case. 64 To
demonsrate how bankruptcy courts can extend Jevic’s process
values to other parts of corporate reorganization, I consider two
aspects of chapter 11 cases raised in these quesions and cas them
in Jevic’s process language.
Both examples occur toward the beginning of chapter 11 cases. I
chose these two examples specifcally because of their timing. The
relevance of Jevic’s process framing is mos evident in the context of
363 sales, gifting, and other end-of-case issues.65 But the
enhancement or impairment of parties’ rights without their consent at
a case’s beginning are key because these changes can ripple
through the case.
Firs, the Code provides for the formation of an ofcial committee of
unsecured creditors soon after a chapter 11 case’s fling. 66 This
committee conceptually represents the interess of all unsecured
creditors, typically by being comprised of seven to nine of the
debtor’s larges unsecured creditors based on the value of creditors’
claims.67 Even so, particularly in the reorganizations of larger
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companies, one committee may be insufcient. In cases with
thousands of creditors, disinct creditor groups may be sufciently
dissimilar from others, but sufciently large in number to merit their
own representatives for these creditors to have a voice. Likewise, a
committee comprised of nine representatives chosen based on
unsecured creditors’ claim amounts may not be sufciently diverse to
give all unsecured creditors the quality of voice required by
procedural jusice. And the unsecured creditors’ committee
necessarily does not represent the interess of equity holders, who
also may deeply desire to have their voices heard.68
Upon a motion by an interesed party or the United States Trusee,
the Code allows the court to appoint additional creditors’ committees
or committees of equity security holders “if necessary to assure
adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders.”69
For example, mass tort victims have asked for, though rarely
received, dedicated committees.70 Similarly, a court may appoint a
representative to protect the interess of a group of claimants, such
as tort victims or employees.71 Indeed, the reason why the issue
presented by Jevic made it to the U.S. Supreme Court was that a
group of former truck drivers banded together to assert their WARN
claims.72
The truck drivers were able to come together because they derived
their priority from their collective WARN claims. In mos other
insances, similar claimants who would beneft from banding together
to express their interess would not have the incentive or perhaps
even the knowledge to do so. At present, case law sets a high
burden for parties asking for additional committees to demonsrate
that they are inadequately represented, partly because the Code
provides judges with discretion to appoint additional committees.73
This sandard makes bankruptcy judges reluctant to appoint
additional committees.74 In the future, judges can call on the process
values embedded in Jevic to jusify the necessity of appointing
additional committees. And other parties, such as the United States
Trusee, can use Jevic to support requess for additional committees.
Importantly, these committees will help ensure that the judge can
assess whether afected parties actually consented to how they are
treated across all the issues raised during cases.
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Second, soon after the petition date, or at the same time as fling, the
debtor-in-possession (DIP) typically fles “frs day motions.” These
motions ask the court to approve details of the reorganizing
company’s day-to-day operations, such as to pay employees and
critical vendors, and to approve fnancing for those operations going
forward.75 Lipson identifes one of Jevic’s potential impacts as a
change in the sandards by which judges assess frs day motions
that disrupt priority in the name of efciency and value
preservation.76 He is careful to note that “these concerns seem
somewhat exaggerated” because “Jevic was careful to speak only
about fnal disributions.”77 Nonetheless, a handful of frs day orders
may result in certain parties’ rights being diminished or
overshadowed by the powers and rights these orders grant to other
parties.78
Among these orders, DIP fnancing sands out.79 Lipson spends
several paragraphs discussing process problems with DIP fnancing
—problems which arise in large part from the priority to payment and
other rights that DIP fnancing agreements grant senior creditors.80
This leads DIP fnancing to “seem to be the key mechanism by which
senior creditors seize control” of the reorganization.81 Because of the
timing of when courts approve both interim and fnal DIP fnancing
agreements, parties often are aforded little choice in matters that
may drasically reallocate their rights. Such reallocation of rights
without explicit consent seems to violate the spirit of Jevic.
Lipson emphasizes that judges can preserve parties’ rights, such as
through carve outs for professional fees and by prohibiting terms that
have little to do with funding the business’s reorganization eforts.82
Carve outs, however, mos often disrupt priority in favor of those
parties, such as professionals, who support the DIP lenders’ and
other secured creditors’ agendas. 83 Likewise, debtors and secured
creditors often band together in support of DIP agreements,
increasing the incentive “to bypass important safeguards” and to
reallocate parties’ rights. 84 Plus, bankruptcy judges may not be
willing to require that DIP agreements include terms that DIP lenders
will view as unfavorable to them in situations in which only one lender
osensibly is willing to inves in the debtor pos-petition.85
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Regardless, the initial (and likely linchpin) problem with DIP fnancing
and certain other frs day orders is their timing. When courts allow
parties to augment and solidify rights through frs day orders, they
not only disrupt priority and other rights, but they also disrupt the
Code’s procedural protections.86 A core lesson of Jevic is that courts
should not tolerate such process violations. In the future, if judges
are reluctant to approve DIP fnancing and other frs day motions
that seem rushed or overbroad, they can call on Jevic to pospone
fnal decisions.
Additionally, if courts are faithful to the process values embedded in
Jevic, they will decelerate their approvals of these motions,
particularly those regarding DIP fnancing, until committees or
representatives have been appointed to speak for all afected parties.
Judges can do so by declining to hand down any other rulings
besides the interim decisions that are necessary to keep the
business operating until committees are appointed. That is, Jevic’s
reasoning speaks more broadly to the process that the Code’s rules
aford debtors, creditors, and other parties throughout chapter 11
cases, even though Jevic focused on the process due when parties
attempt to bypass the Code’s priority rules through sructured
dismissals. This extension of Jevic’s reasoning about process to
other aspects of modern corporate reorganization indicates that Jevic
is capable of halting chapter 11’s current slide into becoming a
sysem that powerful parties control by writing the rules as they see
ft from case beginning to case end.
***
In the end, whether and the extent to which courts will consider
extending Jevic’s reasoning depends on their views of the
importance of preserving procedural protections for all parties, as
well as the coss and benefts of doing so. Lipson tailors the
quesions he poses at the end of his article about Jevic’s legacy
specifcally for “empirically minded” scholars.87 Lipson words some of
the quesions in terms of a cos-beneft or resource-allocation
analysis. Given corporate reorganization’s focus on value
maximization to the exclusion of all other values, this makes sense.
But as empirically minded scholars consider Jevic’s efects, it is
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crucial that they do not lose sight of the harder-to-quantify benefts
that procedural jusice afords to parties in individual cases and the
business bankruptcy sysem generally. Protecting procedural jusice
is not unwarranted or foolhardy. Rather, failing to recognize and
defend the robusness of the processes built into the Code will
negatively afect corporate reorganization.
<<

FOOTNOTES
* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My thanks to
Jonathan Lipson for the opportunity to comment on his excellent Article. Thanks
also to Laura Napoli Coordes, Andrew Dawson, Diane Lourdes Dick, Melissa
Jacoby, and Jody Madeira for helpful comments and discussion.
1. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis
(1975) (establishing the foundations of procedural justice); Rebecca HollanderBlumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63
Hastings L.J. 127, 134–37 (2011) (canvassing procedural justice research).
2. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 94–112 (1990) (discussing how
people’s experiences during legal proceedings influence their perceptions of
outcomes’ legitimacy); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 129 (discussing how
people assess the legitimacy of a legal system); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff &
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 3–4 (2011) (overviewing
research about the effects of people’s perceptions of procedural justice).
3. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 Ct. Rev. 26, 28–29
(2007) (noting that process is the primary factor for parties and public in
accepting decisions).
4. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The
Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L.
Rev. 661, 666–68 (2007) [hereinafter Tyler, Rule of Law] (linking the rule of law
to procedural justice).
5. Some scholars have focused on procedural issues in chapter 11, even if they
did not explicitly characterize their scholarship in procedural terms. Notable
recent works are: Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, 52 Ga. L. Rev.
437 (2018) (exploring the use of debtor-in-possession financing to gain control
of restructuring and shut out other stakeholders); Diane Lourdes Dick, Valuation
in Chapter 11: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1487
(2017) (discussing the importance of financial disclosures in chapter 11 to
process); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L.
Rev. 759 (2013) (critiquing chapter 11’s emphasis on speed and efficiency);
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Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1715
(2018) (linking the lessons of procedural justice with chapter 11); Melissa B.
Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in
Chapter 11, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 673 (2018) (discussing value-allocation in
bankruptcy); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating
the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 Yale L.J. 862, 870 (2014)
[hereinafter Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds] (discussing value and the
reorganization process); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One
Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming
2019) (discussing how the market for bankruptcy claims affects the Code’s
procedural protections); Melissa B. Jacoby, Congressional Testimony on H.R.
2533: “The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011” 3 (UNC Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 1975868, 2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1975868 [https://perma.cc/45XN-MQ9S] (discussing
procedural fairness in bankruptcy). Scholars also have written more generally
about the importance of process to maximizing value. See generally Lynn M.
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(2007); Stephen Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 Ky. L.J. 839
(2004); Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 828 (2010); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003).
6. Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After
Jevic, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 631 (2018).
7. 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
8. See supra note 5.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (2012).
10. See Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How RentSeeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1235, 1236 (2013)
(discussing priority).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 et seq.
12. Id. at § 363(b). See also Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty to Keep Its
Options Open, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 817, 819–22 (2015) (overviewing the debate
about the rise of 363 sales); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 603, 609
(2009) (reporting on data from a sample of chapter 11 cases filed in 2002 that
only 6% of cases involved more than $100 million in assets); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View,
2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 831, 837–38 (discussing the rise of 363 sales in very large
cases).
13. See Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 5, at 865 (discussing the
“melting ice cube” theory).
14. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed secured creditors’ rights to
credit bid in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639
(2012). Gifting also poses questions about parties’ rights. See Ralph Brubaker,
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Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “Inter-Class Gifting is Dead!
Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!”, Bankr. L. Letter, Apr. 2011, at 1, 1–15
(discussing gifting); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and OptionPreservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 760 (2011)
(discussing quick sales and creditors’ incentives); Sally McDonald Henry,
Chapter 11 Zombies, 50 Ind. L. Rev. 579, 600–06 (2017) (connecting gifting to
structured dismissals).
15. For a detailed overview of Jevic’s facts, see Lipson, supra note 6, at 640–46.
16. See id. at 666–67; Henry, supra note 14, at 580–81, 583–85 (2017) (calling
structured dismissals “Zombie Plans”). Structured dismissals also can bypass
the plan process after 363 sales. See Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean,
Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and Growing Alternative After Asset
Sales, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., June 2010, at 1, 56.
17. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 980–81 (2017).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 981; see also Lipson, supra note 6, at 642–43 (noting that the structured
dismissal “would have both stripped the drivers of their priority claims in
bankruptcy and forbidden them from pursuing any other remedies against those
who allegedly harmed them outside bankruptcy,” such as the potentially
fraudulent transfer arising from the LBO).
21. See Lipson, supra note 6, at 643.
22. Id. at 634–35.
23. Id. at 685–88 (discussing how senior creditors control the beginning and middle
of chapter 11 cases through financing agreements).
24. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981 (explaining that the drivers sued Jevic and the
investors).
25. See supra note 20.
26. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
27. See Amitav Banerjee et al., Hypothesis Testing, Type I and II Errors, 18 Ind.
Psychiatry J. 127 (2009) (defining Type I and Type II error); Lipson, supra note 6,
at 653 (discussing false positives and false negatives).
28. Lipson, supra note 6, at 653.
29. Id.
30. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 982.
31. Lipson, supra note 6, at 635.
32. Id. at 637.
33. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 135 (noting these four factors); Tyler,
Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 665 (outlining four elements, “participation,
neutrality, treatment with dignity and respect, and trust in authorities,” that
“shape reactions to the courts”).
34. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 135 (noting voice); Tyler, Rule of Law,
supra note 4, at 663 (discussing the importance of having a “day in court”).
35. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 135 (linking participation with control,
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noting that “perceptions about control over process are an important determinant
of whether people feel that procedural justice has occurred”).
36. See id. (discussing these three elements); Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note
2, at 5 (linking trust with voice).
37. Lipson, supra note 6, at 637, 678–82. This reflects the Court’s concerns about
bargaining powers and making settlements even more difficult to achieve.
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017).
38. See generally Rebecca Holland-Blumoff, Fairness Beyond the Legal System, 85
Ford. L. Rev. 2081 (2017).
39. Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1609,
1620 (2009); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do In Chapter
11?, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 572 (2015) (discussing the importance of negotiations
in chapter 11).
40. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
41. Id. at 987.
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. Lipson, supra note 6, at 638, 671.
44. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
45. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 987 (quoting Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 427 (2014)).
49. Lipson, supra note 6, at 639. This includes debates about the creditors’ bargain
and contractualism. See Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, supra note 5,
at 1721–23 (overviewing debate); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 775, 776–78 (1987).
50. Lipson, supra note 6, at 656; see also Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity,
supra note 5, at 1717–18 (discussing a model of “corporate bankruptcy as a
public-private partnership”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Commercial Law and the
Public Interest, 4 Penn St. J.L. & Int’l Aff. 445, 450 (2015) (lamenting the lack of
“public interest” concerns discussed in corporate reorganization scholarship).
51. See generally Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, supra note 5.
52. Non-consensual creditors are parties that did not contract with the debtor. See
id. at 1716 (“[S]cholarship insufficiently attends to claimants whose rights
against a bankrupt company arise through pathways other than the fine print of
a contract.”). For a recent discussion of sexual assault victims’ treatment in
business bankruptcy, see Melissa Jacoby’s series blog posts on Credit Slips
about The Weinstein Company’s chapter 11 case. Melissa Jacoby, Postings by
Melissa Jacoby, Credit Slips,
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/JacobyAuthor.html
[https://perma.cc/U5KF-6AGR].
53. See generally Warren, supra note 49.
54. Lipson, supra note 6, at 657.
55. See supra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
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56. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Edward J. Janger, Towards a Jurisprudence of Public Law
Bankruptcy Judging, 12 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 39 (2017) (discussing
public law judging in the context of municipal reorganization); Nathalie D. Martin,
Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59
Ohio St. L.J. 429 (1998) (discussing parties that have “nonpecuniary” interests in
bankruptcy cases in the context of providing these parties standing); Kathleen
G. Noonan, Jonathan C. Lipson & William H. Simon, Courts as Institutional
Reformers: Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation (Colum. Law Sch. Pub. Law,
Research Paper No. 14-572, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3082672 (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (comparing reorganization and
public law litigation).
58. The chapter 11 filings of Enron, General Motors, and Lehman Brothers are but a
few examples. Enron was valued at $65.5 billion when it filed. General Motors
was valued at $91 billion. And Lehman Brothers was valued at $691 billion. See
Alex Howe, The 11 Largest Bankruptcies in American History, Bus. Insider (Nov.
29, 2011, 12:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/largest-bankruptcies-inamerican-history-2011-11 [https://perma.cc/4YBC-RJC3].
59. Lipson, supra note 6, at 657.
60. Examples include the chapter 11 filings of over a dozen Catholic dioceses and
The Weinstein Company’s recent chapter 11 case. See Catholic Dioceses and
Orders That Filed for Bankruptcy and Other Major Settlements, Nat’l Cath. Rep.
(May 31, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/catholicdioceses-and-orders-filed-bankruptcy-and-other-major-settlements
[https://perma.cc/X4TF-TUYK]; supra note 52; infra Part III.
61. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate
Reorganization Failing?, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 401, 427–33 (2006) (discussing
creditor control).
62. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
63. Lipson, supra note 6, at 707–12.
64. Id. at 707–09.
65. Id. at 711–12 (discussing asset sales); see also Vincent S. J. Buccola, The
Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing
that Jevic’s holding and logic is confined only to end-of-case issues); supra
notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
67. Id. at § 1102(b)(1); see generally Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic,
Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees
in Business Reorganization, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 749 (2011) (discussing the role of
the official creditor’s committee and empirically studying the impact of creditors’
committees in chapter 11).
68. See generally Diane Lourdes Dick, Grassroots Shareholder Activism in Large
Commercial Bankruptcies, 40 J. Corp. L. 1 (2014) (discussing how shareholders
have come together to assert their rights in corporate reorganizations).

https://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/online-edition/foohey[12/21/2018 9:09:56 AM]

Jevic's Promise: Procedural Justice in Chapter 11 | UW School of Law

69. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
70. See generally Corinne McCarthy, Comment, Creditors’ Committees: Giving Tort
Claimants a Voice in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 31 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 431
(2015) (detailing requests made by tort victims for separate committees to
represent their interests).
71. These representatives often are appointed when all claimants may not be
readily identified at the beginning of a chapter 11 case. For example, the
bankruptcy judge approved the appointment of a future claims representative for
sexual abuse victims in the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis’s chapter
11 case. See Bankruptcy Judge Appoints Future Claims Representative, Cath.
Spirit (Feb. 10, 2017), http://thecatholicspirit.com/news/local-news/bankruptcyjudge-appoints-future-claims-representative/ [https://perma.cc/N59F-URAT].
72. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
73. See McCarthy, supra note 70, at 443 (discussing case law).
74. See id. at 443 n.84 (noting that bankruptcy courts view the appointment of
additional creditors’ committees as “an extraordinary remedy”).
75. See Elizabeth Warren et. al, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 413–14 (7th ed.
2014) (discussing first day motions).
76. Lipson, supra note 6, at 709.
77. Id. (emphasis omitted).
78. See Henry, supra note 14, at 593–97 (discussing first day orders that often
disrupt the Code’s priority rules).
79. See Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, supra note 5, at 1718, 1730–31
(identifying DIP financing as a “feature[ ] of modern Chapter 11 that distort[s] the
balance in the public-private partnership”); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past,
Present, and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 25 Cardozo L. Rev.
1905, 1905 (2004) (discussing the creditor control inherent in DIP financing).
80. Lipson, supra note 6, at 710–11.
81. Id. at 710; see also Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 476–87
(detailing how senior creditors can use DIP financing to seize “valuable upside
rights”); Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, supra note 5, at 1730–31
(discussing how creditors use DIP financing agreements to insulate themselves
from being sued and otherwise “direct the activities of the bankruptcy estate”).
82. Lipson, supra note 6, at 710–11; see also Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, supra
note 5, at 477–87 (discussing the protections that DIP lenders typically receive).
83. See Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 481 (discussing carve outs);
Henry, supra note 14, at 597–99 (noting how carve outs disrupt priority).
84. Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 479. See also id. at 479–87
(noting that the Code’s checks on lender overreach will not police DIP financing
because the checks assume “that debtors are at odds with their creditors”).
85. See id. at 483 (discussing “unique aspects of the bankruptcy lending
environment”).
86. See id. at 494 (“[P]ostpetition financing arrangements in all Chapter 11 cases
are capable of shifting or reinforcing the balance of power among the parties
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and foreclosing other restructuring outcomes that may better advance the
interests of stakeholders.”).
87. Lipson, supra note 6, at 707.
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